Vertical Boundaries

Chapter 10: Vertical boundaries Chapter 10: Vertical boundaries Aim of the chapter To understand the factors that influence the ways in which transactions on a vertical chain (value chain) should be/are located on the market–organisation continuum. Learning objectives On completion of this chapter and the essential reading, you should have a good understanding of the following terms and concepts: †¢ transaction cost economics †¢ strategic calculation. Essential reading Buchanan, D. and A. Huczynski Organizational behaviour: an introductory text. (London: Prentice Hall, 2008) Chapter 18. Douma, S. nd H. Schreuder Economic approaches to organisations. (London: Prentice Hall, 2008). Further reading Besanko, D. , D. Dranove and M. Shanley Economics of strategy. (New York: Wiley, 1996). Coase, R. H. ‘The problem of social cost’, Journal of Law and Economics 3 1960, pp. 1–44. Grossman, S. and O. Hart ‘The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration’, Journal of Political Economy 94(4) 1986, pp. 691–719. Williamson, O. E. ‘The economics of organization: the transaction cost approach’, American Journal of Sociology 87(3) 1981, pp. 548–77. 10. 1 IntroductionAs noted in Chapter 1, we may regard the basic unit in organisational analysis as an exchange or transaction generated in the division of labour. The division of labour (exogenous/endogenous – Chapter 3) creates value or vertical chains; for example as shown in Figure 10. 1(a) running from crude oil extraction to the retailing of petroleum products. We now operate at the level of organisations or firms (recognising that at a greater level of disaggregation the points in the chain are also based on chains of the division of labour) and pose the question as to where their boundaries should be located on the value chain.In fact the picture is usually more complex than the one depicted in Figure 10. 1(a). Activities usually depend on inputs at all points down the vertical chain, as depicted in Figure 10. 1(b). So organisations or market exchanges could control and coordinate each of these transactions. Furthermore, some of these inputs may be common to the points on the main chain (see Appendix 1. 2 in this guide), like accounting services, in which case the picture looks more like Figure 10. 1(c). Note the use of di-graphs once again. 91 Organisation theory: an interdisciplinary approach a) Oil extraction Refining Retailing †¢ (b) Shipping or pipe †¢ †¢ †¢ Distribution †¢ †¢ †¢ †¢ (c) †¢ †¢ †¢ Accounting †¢ Figure 10. 1 †¢ †¢ †¢ In general we are asking the question as to whether a particular transaction should be internalised (make) or left in the market (buy), as depicted in Figure 10. 2; that is, whether a point on the chain should be a department/ function or division or remain independent. For the momen t we restrict our attention to this simple choice rather than the more elaborate positioning on the market–organisation continuum.We shall return to the more elaborate issue later on. †¢ †¢ Market (Price mechanism) Figure 10. 2 Start by asking what the benefits and costs of using the market might be. The benefits could include the following: †¢ Independent firms may be able to reap the benefits of economies of scale (i. e. operate at an output that minimises unit costs) whereas internal departments may not. Unless the firm itself can absorb all the efficient output of the department, it must either operate below the optimal output level or sell on to another firm.This might compromise any information advantages of the purchasing firm (see below). †¢ Independent firms are more subject to market disciplines than departments and may hold down costs they can control more effectively. Costs may be difficult to identify in departments. Firms might, though, attem pt to replicate market incentives inside organisations. Tapered integration refers to a situation where a firm is supplied partially by an independent firm and partially by its own department. This allows their relative cost structures to be compared. Independent firms (i. e. their managers) may have stronger incentives to innovate when compared with managers of departments. †¢ †¢ Organisation †¢ 92 Chapter 10: Vertical boundaries The costs of using the market might include the following: †¢ Private information may be leaked to independent firms – particularly if there is a need to share technical information. †¢ The focal firm becomes to a degree dependent upon an independent supplier (depending upon switching costs).Thus the latter has a power resource (see Chapter 6) and may use it to hold up the focal firm. It may prove difficult to control and co-ordinate flows of goods and services down a vertical chain of independent firms. This may be particul arly so where there is a need to fit the products closely. ‘Just-intime’ methods seek to overcome this problem and permit independent firms often with long-term relational contracts (see below). The way most economists (following Coase and Williamson) think about the choice between a market and organisational exchange/transaction is entirely predictable – choose the arrangement that minimises costs. The innovation here is to ntroduce the idea of transaction costs – the costs involved in making (controlling and co-ordinating) the transaction. They are sometimes referred to as agency costs, and agency efficiency is found where they are minimised.So, if both production costs (which relate to technical efficiency) and transaction costs vary between organisational transactions and market transactions, then the total costs should be minimised. Activity Now read Sections 8. 1 and 8. 2 in D and S. If you would like to read a slightly more comprehensive economic ap proach to vertical integration, then read Besanko et al. 1996). In a world of fully informed, rational actors where contracting is complete, there are no transaction costs and the choice between market and organisational exchange is of no consequence (at least as conceived within this framework) unless production costs vary (which, again, they should not under the same assumptions). It is because we relax both the assumptions of full rationality and full information in the context of ‘real markets’ that transaction costs arise and the choice between market and organisational transaction is pertinent.Transaction costs theory is used both in a normative and positive sense. The new assumptions are as follows: †¢ Individual bounded rationality: people are intentionally rational but limitedly so. Individuals are neither able to make very complex calculations nor to assimilate large amounts of information. As you might expect, sociologists tend to like this assumption; t hey see it as more realistic than the full assumptions of rationality. †¢ Opportunism: individuals are not only self-interested but behave with guile.For example, in the context of game theory, individuals will issue promises which are not credible, make use of asymmetric information and they cannot be trusted. †¢ Contracting about transactions is incomplete because of inherent uncertainty and incomplete information. †¢ Contracting can thus lead to ex ante opportunism (namely, adverse selection) and ex post opportunism (namely, moral hazard). †¢ These hazards will be exacerbated to the degree that there is little choice of transacting partners and therefore reputations (see Chapter 7) in respect of third parties will not constrain opportunism – small numbers exchange. 3 Organisation theory: an interdisciplinary approach †¢ Anticipated repeated interaction will make reputations important to both parties but if in the process there is learning by doing, it is then costly to later switch exchange partner. Williamson (1981) calls this the ‘fundamental transformation’ – it ties the parties into the relationship. †¢ Williamson also observes that parties to a transaction might have a preference for a certain type of transaction in addition to the costs and benefits. He calls this ‘atmosphere’. In effect Williamson is introducing wider motives/utilities.Although the vocabulary introduced by Williamson is rather daunting at first sight, it has the advantage that it should link your thoughts into many of the ideas you have already encountered. Activity Think of transactions as a prisoner’s dilemma or trust game. Both parties would like to contract to achieve Pareto efficiency but each is wary of the other and in the absence of some mechanism to offset this wariness, the exchange does not materialise – the Nash equilibrium. So what mechanisms are available? You should be able to list the mechanisms.They can be derived as follows. Competitive market – the price as a sufficient statistic; here the prisoner’s dilemma does not model the situation. Organisation – three possible mechanisms which can produce the Pareto-efficient outcome rather than the Nash equilibrium are: 1. Authority and power. 2. Trust (cultural mechanisms). 3. Repeated transaction and reputation effects. As we have seen in earlier chapters, alongside monitoring and employment contracts (incentives), we expect organisations to avail themselves of a mixture of these mechanisms.But note, if we think in terms of ‘real markets’ rather than the ideal type of perfect markets, then the price mechanism is not sufficient and perhaps these mechanisms might also apply at different positions on the market–organisation continuum. We shall return to these matters later. Transaction cost economics embraces not only an unorthodox model of the individual but characterises aspect s (‘dimensions’, to use D and S’s terminology) of transactions that impact upon the transaction costs.Activity Now read Section 8. 3 in D and S. The argument is that asset specificity (sometimes called ‘relation-specific assets’), uncertainty/complexity and frequency of exchange all increase the likelihood that a transaction will be placed (governed) inside an organisation (that is, make) rather than left to the market (that is, buy). Asset specificity comes in different forms: †¢ site specificity – adjacent sites, usually to economise on transport and communication costs †¢ physical asset specificity – e. g. pipeline delivering crude oil †¢ dedicated assets – assets of a particular buyer dedicated to a particular relationship †¢ human asset specificity – skills dedicated to a particular relationship which would be less valuable elsewhere. 94 Chapter 10: Vertical boundaries So we now have a predictive t heory about vertical integration and, incidentally, contracting out. By and large, empirical evidence has supported transaction cost theory – particularly the impact of complexity in the context of uncertainty – though one should bear in mind what Williamson terms ‘atmosphere’.If there are widespread specific preferences – for instance, managers might prefer the power implied by organisation – this would complicate the picture. Furthermore, other factors might influence the choice between market and organisation. Regulation and taxation can confer advantages in deciding where profits are generated. For instance, taxation might favour small firms, and firms operating across different national tax regimes may find it an advantage to contract out. An organisation might vertically integrate to gain a monopoly or acquire information or to limit the flow of information to competitors (see below).Given all these possibilities, it is perhaps surprisi ng that such strong empirical support for transaction cost theory is found. Appendix 10. 1 in this guide gives a slightly more formal approach to Williamson’s reasoning. The transaction costs approach still leaves open two questions: 1. Will the integration, if appropriate, be backwards or forwards? 2. What type of organisation – e. g. centralised or decentralised hierarchy? (I leave an answer to this question to Chapter 12. ) An extension of transaction costs theory called property rights theory (which is not covered in D and S) provides an answer to the first question.When a transaction is internalised within an organisation, then ownership should (note the normative word) go to the party with the greatest impact upon the post-contractual rents. Activity Although this theory falls beyond this course, you might like to read Grossman and Hart (1986). Property rights theory is essentially a theory of bargaining power. Incomplete contracts mean that residual extra-contra ctual control of assets is important. Ownership confers bargaining power over operational decisions when enforceable contracts break down.Anticipation of post-contractual hazards determines earlier investment decisions. We now need to complicate the picture by reintroducing the market–organisation continuum, as in Figure 10. 3. I use the term ‘continuum’ with a certain amount of licence as the alternative positions on it vary in a number of respects and could be reordered. The continuum runs from perfect competition, at one end, to integration or organisation, at the other. The question now is: where should a transaction be placed on the continuum?Before answering this, let us look at what B and H have to say about the issues we have been discussing. 95 Organisation theory: an interdisciplinary approach Spot markets (perfect competition) Real markets Bargaining Franchising Long term contracts (network organisations) Tapered organisations Virtual organisations All iances Joint venture Monopoly (small numbers) Externalities Asymmetric information Fixed cost (risk to supplier) Risk sharing Cost plus (risk to buyer) Decentralised Integration (up/down) organisation Figure 10. Activity Now read Chapter 18 in B and H. Again, this chapter in B and H is extremely detailed; you need to master the main ideas running down the left-hand margin. None of them is inconsistent with anything you have learned from D and S; though note that the definition of vertical integration is in fact backwards vertical integration. Table 16. 3 in B and H gives a good overview of what I have termed the organisation–market continuum. So let us now return to the continuum – see Figure 10. 3 – keeping the rich descriptions in B and H’s chapter in mind.First, look at what I have termed ‘real markets’. Here we recognise that in the real world the market environment is often far from perfectly competitive. If the transaction is left to th e price mechanism, then various market distortions may undermine the price as a sufficient statistic. If, for instance, a supplier holds a monopoly, then backwards vertical integration may look attractive to a buyer. Likewise, a buyer might be tempted to vertically integrate backwards in order to acquire information or to reap benefits of vertical synergies (externalities).Long-term contracts (which will inevitably be incomplete) enable organisations to engage in a protracted relationship. They often occur between buyers and suppliers in a vertical chain. D and S introduced the idea of ‘relational contracting’ (an equivalent term). Remember, whenever you think in terms of contracts you need to think of the incentive, risksharing and information aspects. Fixed-term contracts put the risk of, say, increases in input prices to the supplier on the supplier’s back. Cost plus contracts reverse the situation. Between these two extremes, risk-sharing contracts can be des igned.If the buyer and supplier have differing risk preferences then, other things being equal, an optimal contract can be found. Network and virtual organisations (see B and H) are usually based upon long-term relational contracts, as are alliances. Joint ventures imply equity contribution from both the supplier and buyer. Centralised 96 Chapter 10: Vertical boundaries So the question now is: where should a particular exogenously generated (by the division of labour) transaction be placed on the market–organisation continuum? (The normative question. Alternatively, where is it placed and why? (The positive questions. ) Transaction cost economics claims to be both normative and positive and answers both questions – minimise transaction and production costs! But as we have seen, this is only part of the story. Activity Now read Section 9. 8 in D and S. In summary, the choice of the position of any vertical transaction on the market–organisation continuum may be s haped by: †¢ economies of scale †¢ anticipated information leakage †¢ acquiring information †¢ transaction costs †¢ residual property rights †¢ market imperfections †¢ regulation.But how are these various strands to be woven together? Unfortunately there is, as far as I am aware, no embracing theory. B and H introduce you to the concept of corporate strategy and to what many organisation theorists term strategic choice. Although the idea that organisational arrangements designed to control and co-ordinate activities are a matter of choice was first introduced by sociologists in reaction to an earlier tradition that spoke of ‘determinism’ – often technological determinism – we can now see this as an unhelpful distinction.Economists will always speak of choice where changing technology might either enhance or restrict the opportunity set which rational decision-takers face. We might then like to think of technological deter minism when for whatever reason, the opportunity comprises a single option. I encourage you to think in these terms even if you want to question the restrictive notion of rationality (see Chapter 1). Activity Now read Chapter 9, particularly Sections 9. 1–9. 7, in D and S. Sections 9. 1 to 9. 6 of D and S cover issues of strategic planning that impinge upon organisation theory but are more often encountered in courses on management theory.You will benefit from reading them but they are not central to this unit. The central idea in management theory concerns the sources of what is termed sustained competitive advantage (SCA). Why do some firms/organisations manage to sustain a better performance than their competitors, while operating in the same markets? Statistics tend to suggest that this is a common experience in many markets. Firms often earn above-average returns (loosely rents) on their assets over relatively extended periods of time. The assumption is that they have so me characteristics (but which? that their competitors find it difficult to replicate or improve upon, at least during the time in which the advantage is sustained. From an organisational theory point of view the question to ask is – are there ways of organising which can confer SCA? Notice that when an organisation possesses a competitive advantage, for whatever reason, then this implies that perfect competition is not operating. In so far as those running organisations seek SCA, they are trying to undermine 97 Organisation theory: an interdisciplinary approach competitive forces.The early sections of D and S’s chapter show how game theory is an indispensable tool in studying competitive strategies. 10. 2 Vertical contracting and strategic choice Consider a transaction between B and S, as in Figure 10. 4. The problem is to design a contractual relationship to gain any possible rents. In terms of competitive advantage this amounts to placing the transaction on the marke t–organisation continuum more effectively than the competition. Assume that there is need for relation-specific assets and a complete contract cannot be signed because of inherent uncertainties.Suppose now that B would like to persuade S to make the relation-specific investment. S’s ex ante problem is that in the absence of trust and credible promises, s/he anticipates that, once the investment is made, B will take advantage of the situation. S anticipates that B will always be able, once the contract is entered into, to find contingencies not covered by the contract. By making the investment, S in effect confers bargaining power upon B – who may even use this power to renegotiate the original contract (attempt to reduce the price of the good or service exchanged).S will then anticipate these moral hazards and accordingly not invest; the transaction will fail and both S and B will be less well off than they could be. Thinking in terms of the (for the moment, one -shot) prisoner’s dilemma, S and B find a Nash equilibrium rather than the Pareto-efficient outcome. So what can be done to achieve the Pareto superior outcome? S Figure 10. 4 B Some possibilities (neither exclusive nor exhaustive) are: †¢ B makes the relation-specific investment (but then B confers bargaining power to S) †¢ B nd S make a joint investment – an alliance or joint venture †¢ S continues to make the investment but enters into a long-term contract with B (note that relation-specific investments tend to imply long-term relationships in the first place) †¢ forward or backward integration (here non-market incentives/ monitoring/authority/power/culture achieve the move from the Nash equilibrium to the Pareto outcome). But let us continue to assume that B wants to find a non-integration solution and still to encourage S to make the costly upfront relation-specific investment.S/he might do this in the recognition that S, as an independent orga nisation, may be relatively small, flexible and focused. S, furthermore, may be driven by a more entrepreneurial spirit than if it were to be a division or department in B’s ‘bureaucracy’. An independent S may be more innovative. Also small organisations tend to have lower labour costs (production costs). If so, then both S and B can benefit. The strategic problem is whether or not the transaction costs (ex ante and ex post) can be kept down while reaping these potential advantages.To offset S’s anticipated moral hazard problems, B needs to search for ways of reducing her/his own and increasing S’s relative bargaining power. To the degree that this proves possible, the strategy will offset S’s anticipated moral hazards. B needs to make her/himself more dependent upon S before the contract is signed. One notable way s/he can secure this is to decentralise some design and innovation responsibilities to S. B now becomes partially dependent 98 Ch apter 10: Vertical boundaries upon S. Furthermore, B can commit not only to a long-term contract but also to relatively unconditional contract renewal.These strategies do of course put B at some risk. But since we are thinking in terms of incentives to transact, you should by now recognise that risk-sharing is another aspect of the possible contracts between S and B that can be subjected to strategic reasoning. Not unreasonably, I think, assume that S is risk-averse and B is risk-neutral. So S will accept a reduction in rent in order to reduce his/her risk and, relatively speaking, B will be prepared to shoulder more risk. So, a risksharing, long-term contract can conceivably lead to a Pareto improvement. Think in terms of post-contractual price negotiation.With a fixed-cost contract any increase in S’s costs will have to be borne by S. S will be reluctant to sign such a contract. With a cost-plus contract, on the other hand, B will bear all the risks of S’s cost incre ases. Furthermore, S will have no incentives to hold costs down nor, perhaps more importantly, to innovate in order to reduce costs. Clearly, B wants S both to innovate and, where possible, to hold down costs. It is not in B’s interests to take the risk from S and undermine these incentives. How can s/he provide appropriate incentives while reducing S’s risks and in so doing make the contract interesting to S?What B needs to do is to accept those risks of cost increases which S cannot control while making S responsible for those s/he can control – a tricky business. B needs to know the nature of S’s cost structure (an information problem – no problem with full information but with information asymmetry it is another story) before s/he can achieve this. Of course, integration might dispel this problem but then we encounter the bureaucratic losses mentioned above. What can B do? Go back to your principal–agent model (see Chapter 4). We can reg ard B as a principal and S as an agent.P (B) can acquire information by having more than one agent (S) operating in the same environment (in practice this is not easy). This is called multiple sourcing. It could be achieved by either multiple external sourcing or having an in-house comparator (tapered sourcing). But, of course, one needs to ask whether B’s sourcing requirements are of sufficient magnitude to reap any economies of scale across the multiple sources. If not, would it be sensible – from an information leakage point of view – to allow the sourcing organisation to sell to other organisations on the open market?If B has decentralised design to S then this might prove hazardous. As we have observed, long-term relationships (see Chapter 8) can invoke trust and reputation effects. Traditionally it was assumed that one of the advantages of integration into an organisation derives from the repeated interaction effects. B and S being in the same organisation , they repeatedly interact and, indeed, they will assume that there is a high enough probability that they will once again interact in the future. Thus prudent calculation can overcome the moral hazards in incomplete contracting.In game-theoretic terms B and S may play TFT (the folk theorem). B may also wish to protect her/his reputation for fair play. In short, an organisation can control and co-ordinate vertical relations by cultural means. However, long-term contracts with a continuation clause also produce repeated interaction (the Japanese were largely responsible, in the 1980s, for recognising this) and, thus, reputation and trust can be generated at other points on the market–organisation continuum. Cultural mechanisms can operate outside formal organisations.If B and S can trust each other not to behave opportunistically, then the advantages of S’s independence and reduced transaction costs can be realised. 99 Organisation theory: an interdisciplinary approach Finally, reverting to an extended value chain where S’s suppliers are also brought into the picture, we obtain the situation as in Figure 10. 5. †¢ †¢ R S B Price and market > †¢ > †¢ †¢ R S B Long-term contracts > †¢ > †¢ †¢ R S B Organisation span of co-ordination = 3 > †¢ > †¢ Figure 10. Should the whole chain be co-ordinated by integration (span of coordination) or perhaps co-ordinated by long-term contracts, etc.? If the latter, should B contract with S and R or should B contract with S and S with R? In either case we have examples of network organisation and even virtual organisation if the relationships are mediated by modern information technology. The strategic complexion of these sorts of organisation is little understood. Why don’t you have a go! I hope this section has given you some appreciation of how to analyse organisation choices from a genuinely strategic point of view.Much of the abo ve reasoning can be underpinned from a game-theoretic standpoint. This further supports my earlier contention that modern organisation theory often requires a knowledge of strategic thinking and game theory. A reminder of your learning outcomes On completion of this chapter and the essential reading, you should have a good understanding of the following terms and concepts: transaction cost economics strategic calculation. Sample examination question 1. Explain why a transaction should be placed in a market or an organisation. 100

Explain why the open war Essay

World War 1 had begun in August with both sides certain that their sudden attacks with cavalry and infantry would create a war of rapid movement, which would bring them a swift victory. The ending of this possibility and build up towards a stationary war of fixed entrenchment was not only due to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and Plan XVII, but the problems in communications, problems faced through tactics and strategies and the role of the commanders throughout the planning and progression of the war. The possibility of further outflanking movements was gone. The initially hastily constructed trenches of the allied forcers took on a more permanent look as two massive armies consisting of over 4 million men faced each other over 800 kilometres of continuous trench lines from the coast of Belgium to the Swiss border. For the next four years, the rival commanders struggled and blundered in an attempt to find a way to break the stalemate, which had emerged by the end of 1914. In order to break the stalemate there were two major offensives remembered from 1916, which both failed but were attempts none the less. Both sides had become aware that it was easier to hold a defensive position than it was to launch an offensive. However, this did not stop them, launching repeated disastrous offensives, relying on weight of men, artillery and supplies to crumble the opposition through attrition and each side endeavored to weaken the other. The generals decided only a ‘big push’ would be able to break through the enemy lines and restart the war of rapid movement. This was not achieved until the attrition of 1915-18 finally weakened the German lines in mid-1918. The Schlieffen Plan, originally devised by Alfred von Schlieffen, the then German Army Chief of Staff, in 1905, was the German Plan which would they would implement to avoid a war on two fronts. Schlieffen argued that France had to be defeated as soon as possible in the event of a great European War. If that were to happen, Schlieffen realised that Russia and France would be unwilling to continue fighting. In addition, Schlieffen estimated that it would take Russia six weeks to mobilise her forces in preparation for war against them. Thus, he reasoned that Germany would have six weeks in which to defeat France and surrender. On August 2nd 1914 the Schlieffen Plan was put into effect and the German Army began its advance upon France through Belgium. The delicate plan was upset with the early arrival of the British Expeditionary Force under Sir John French, significant resistance by the Belgian Army, resistance of the Belgians and the early arrival of Russian Forces. The German implementations and strategies relied too heavily on the Schlieffen Plan itself. The plan greatly depended on speed and movement, the strict deadline of 42 days was impractical, this unreasonable goal was pushed further away from the Germans. General von Moltke did not follow through the original Schlieffen Plan; instead, he had shifted the numbers of the planned armies and therefore altered the balance for the plan to work. All these events led up to the Battle of the Marne, the first major battle on the Western Front. The French Allied victory at this battle marked the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, and the death of any German hope for a quick decisive victory. The German forces were not only to blame for the reason of stationary war during 1914, the problems with the French Plan XVII also contributed to the fact.

James Weldon Johnson Biography

James Weldon Johnson Biography Free Online Research Papers James Weldon Johnsons career was one of extraordinary range, spanning the worlds of diplomacy (as U.S. consul in Venezuela and Nicaragua), politics (as Secretary of the NAACP), journalism (as founder of one newspaper and longtime editor of another), musical theater (as lyricist for the Broadway songwriting team of Cole and Johnson Brothers), and literature (as novelist, poet, and anthologist). At the dawning of what would become the modern civil rights movement, he forged a record of accomplishment that defied the odds. While a freshman in college, Johnson took a trip throughout the rural South, igniting his interest in the African American folk tradition. Later he would incorporate the rhythms and ideals of these traditions in his uniquely beautiful poetry. After graduating from the University, Johnson first became a high school principal; then in 1906, he accepted the position of U.S. Consul in Venezuela and later in Nicaragua. While overseas, Johnson had several poems published in the United States.In 1912, James published anonymously his novel, The Autobiography of an Ex- Colored Man This novel tells the story of a mulatto giving up his racial roots for the comfort of being a mediocre, middle-class white person. The book is very interesting The Autobiography of an Ex- Colored Man is about a young man born in the southern state of Georgia, but was raised in the northern part of the country, which is frequently referred to as Negro friendly. Growing up he didn’t know if he was black or white.He lives alone with his mother and where a kind white man used to visit them., he knows that she received secret money from the man in Georgia and supported them . Soon after this the boy learned that the white man from Georgia was his father, that this man had moved his mistress and her son to Connecticut when he married a local high-class Southern white woman, and that he had promised to educate his child. This fact just makes the boy even more confused then ever. The crisis throughout the novel centers on the narrators discovering his identity. The ex-colored man lives between a black and white societies until he witnesses a lynching of a black man that ends with the mans being burned alive. He feels ashamed of the black race because he believes that they would allow themselves to be treated worse than animals and in that his country would allow a human being to be burned alive. Because of this killing, the ex-colored man declares that he would neither disclaim the black race nor claim the white race. He ends his days living a comfortable, life passing as a white man. However, at times, the ex-colored man regrets that he failed to join with the black men who were making history and a race.. The ex-colored man goes to his grave an ex-colored man, I believe that if the ex-colored man did not pass for a white man than he probably would have died a black man. In the ex-colored man’s early life, his mother does not show him his cultural background and I believe that this adds to the boys identity crisis. Most of experiences that the ex-colored man faced would not have had such a big impact on him if he did not pass for a white man. At the end of chapter one, the boy mother informs him that he in fact a black man. Black Code laws was going on when The Autobiography of an Ex- Colored Man was written Black code laws controlled almost every aspect of life was regulated, including the freedom to roam. Often blacks were prohibited from entering towns without permission. In Opelousas, Louisiana, blacks needed permission from their employer to enter the town. A note was required, and it had to state the nature and length of the visit. Any black found without a note after ten oclock at night was subject to imprisonment. Residency within towns and cities was also discouraged. Local ordinances in Louisiana made it almost impossible for blacks to live within the towns or cities. Residency was only possible if a white employer agreed to take responsibility for his employees conduct. The Autobiography of an Ex- Colored Man and The Color of Water are both alike. Ruth McBride was a religious woman. She loved going to church. Religion played a big part role in her life. She put religion and education before anything else. The only thing she would look forward to all week was going to church on Sunday. But religion didnt always play a positive role in her life. Made her feel different from others. Religion made her feel alienated, but it was her protector, and her love. Religion didnt always play a positive aspect in her life. She felt different from everyone at the time. Even Jewish people were made fun of, and ridiculed at one time. She would get made fun of at school, so she wouldnt socialize with anyone. Ruth didn’t sow that she was white. Unlike Ruth the doesn’t know that he is black and that’s how James McBride was, he didn’t understand that his mother was white because she never brought it up. Both of these character relate be cause it shows how race can truly determine who you are as a person. If you don’t know who you are and where you come from, than you don’t know where you are going. This book was originally published anonymously because this book was written when the world was not as understanding about different races being mixed as they are in today’s society. Although the world is not the same we still have racism in the world except it not as bad as before. If James Weldon Johnson would have revealed who he was than the public probably wasn’t going to accept it, because no one had ever talked about. We live in a world of differences, that’s why sometimes race can play as a major factor in our lives.I believe that if the boy would have known from the start that he was a black man then his life would have been a lot better. He would have been prepared for the world and would have known who he was as a person and wouldn’t had to search for the answers all of his life. Research Papers on James Weldon Johnson BiographyWhere Wild and West MeetThe Masque of the Red Death Room meaningsCapital PunishmentHonest Iagos Truth through Deception19 Century Society: A Deeply Divided EraStandardized TestingThe Hockey GameThe Spring and AutumnHip-Hop is ArtMind Travel

Free Essays on Hamlets Loneliness

Hamlet’s Loneliness Shakespeare’s work â€Å"Hamlet† focuses on several general themes that run throughout literature. The least obvious theme is loneliness. In Hamlet most of the suffering and loneliness Hamlet endures is brought with the secrets and betrayals he is forced to keep. In the story there are many instances where Hamlet is left lone with nobody to talk with about his pain and how it upsets him. This along with the betrayals of his former best friends torments young Hamlet throughout the play. These factors not only torment the young man but lead to his untimely demise as well. Hamlet learns rather quickly who is loyal to him and whom not to trust. The very first line he speaks gives away the feelings he has towards his uncle â€Å"A little more than kin, and less than kind." (I; ii; 65). He already distraught with the loss of his father but the addition of his cold, cruel uncle marrying Hamlet’s beloved mother is too much for the Dane to endure. His mother is another whom Hamlet feels betrayed him as well as her former husband by casting aside all love she felt for him and marrying his brother only a few months after his death. " Mother, you have my father much offended." (III; iv; 11) " A bloody deed-almost as bad, good mother, As kill a king, and marry with his brother. (III; iv; 29-30). Hamlet’s emotions suffered another casualty with the loss of the love his life Ophelia. Hamlet distances himself away from her as part of his crazed disposition â€Å"plan†. By insulting her and convincing Ophelia that he never loved her he further offends his soul. . "I loved you not" (III; i; 117) "Get thee to a nunnery†¦Marry a fool, for wise men know well enough what monsters you make of them" (III; i; 135-137). The final blow for Ophelia’s heart comes when Hamlet kills Polonius by mistaking him for Claudius. These actions lead Ophelia with no one to talk with and she takes her own life. The loss of his love d... Free Essays on Hamlet's Loneliness Free Essays on Hamlet's Loneliness Hamlet’s Loneliness Shakespeare’s work â€Å"Hamlet† focuses on several general themes that run throughout literature. The least obvious theme is loneliness. In Hamlet most of the suffering and loneliness Hamlet endures is brought with the secrets and betrayals he is forced to keep. In the story there are many instances where Hamlet is left lone with nobody to talk with about his pain and how it upsets him. This along with the betrayals of his former best friends torments young Hamlet throughout the play. These factors not only torment the young man but lead to his untimely demise as well. Hamlet learns rather quickly who is loyal to him and whom not to trust. The very first line he speaks gives away the feelings he has towards his uncle â€Å"A little more than kin, and less than kind." (I; ii; 65). He already distraught with the loss of his father but the addition of his cold, cruel uncle marrying Hamlet’s beloved mother is too much for the Dane to endure. His mother is another whom Hamlet feels betrayed him as well as her former husband by casting aside all love she felt for him and marrying his brother only a few months after his death. " Mother, you have my father much offended." (III; iv; 11) " A bloody deed-almost as bad, good mother, As kill a king, and marry with his brother. (III; iv; 29-30). Hamlet’s emotions suffered another casualty with the loss of the love his life Ophelia. Hamlet distances himself away from her as part of his crazed disposition â€Å"plan†. By insulting her and convincing Ophelia that he never loved her he further offends his soul. . "I loved you not" (III; i; 117) "Get thee to a nunnery†¦Marry a fool, for wise men know well enough what monsters you make of them" (III; i; 135-137). The final blow for Ophelia’s heart comes when Hamlet kills Polonius by mistaking him for Claudius. These actions lead Ophelia with no one to talk with and she takes her own life. The loss of his love d...

Immigrants, Emigrants, and Migrants

Immigrants, Emigrants, and Migrants Immigrants, Emigrants, and Migrants Immigrants, Emigrants, and Migrants By Maeve Maddox A reader asks: Emigrate, immigrate, migrate.   What is the proper usage of these words?   It seems like the [use] is indiscriminate. All three words trace their origin to the Latin verb migrare, â€Å"to remove from one place to another.† This common ancestor gives English four verbs: migrate: to move, either temporarily or permanently, from one place, area, or country of residence to another emigrate: (e, â€Å"out† + migrate) to remove out of country for the purpose of settling in another. immigrate: (im, â€Å"in, into† + migrate) to come to settle in a country not one’s own; to pass into a new place of residence. transmigrate: (trans, â€Å"across† + migrate) of the soul: to pass after death into another body. The verbs yield several noun forms, some of which are also used as adjectives: migration migrant emigration emigrant immigration immigrant transmigration Usage examples from the Web: There is a challenge for policy-makers to understand the obstacles migrants face in Australia. Committee on Migrant Workers discusses role of migration statistics for treaty reporting and migration policies. Although not common, two additional adjectives sometimes seen are immigrational and migrational. From Multiculturalism to Immigrational Survavalism [sic] (headline at novitiate.com) Immigrational Background Affects the Effectiveness of a School-based Overweight Prevention Program Promoting Water Consumption (title of research paper) A common error is to confuse immigrant and emigrant. Here’s an instance when etymological information can help with spelling. Just remember that the prefix im- means â€Å"in† and that the prefix e- means â€Å"out†: When Charles Darnay fled France to escape the guillotine, he was an emigrant. When he settled in England, he was an immigrant. A migrant is simply on the move, not necessarily planning a permanent change of address. Plants and animals also migrate, as do things on computers. Want to improve your English in five minutes a day? Get a subscription and start receiving our writing tips and exercises daily! Keep learning! Browse the Misused Words category, check our popular posts, or choose a related post below:Apply to, Apply for, and Apply withWhat's a Male Mistress?List of 50 Compliments and Nice Things to Say!

Economic opinion Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Economic opinion - Essay Example In the book it is concluded that owners of private equity reduce more jobs than the other firms, however, the net impact is minimal and following a private company taking over a firm, it their people who take over as directors who fare bad in terms of retention of jobs. Also according to the book, research shows that wages decrease in a span of two years following the private-equity buyouts even though there is an increase in productivity. This proposes that financial profits from high output are being changed into returns for owners instead of salary hits for the workers. Also, whereas some private-equity companies market themselves to be union friendly, some are unfriendly and still others are opposed (Weber 1). According to the authors of the book cited in the article, there are a number of things that distinguish the private-equity companies from those that are traded publicly. One is that such companies have great amounts of debts. Approximately, privately equity companies run with approximately 70 percent debt and 30 percent equity. This ratio is basically reversed by the public firms which has approximately 30 percent of to their capital from bonds, as well as other liabilities (Weber 1). The article also states that whereas the inventors in the public companies are mostly distinct from those who manage the company, the private-equity owners are the ones who manage the companies despite being the investors. This builds incentives for the owners manage the operational decisions for the short-term profits to the owners. Partly owing to this, the private-equity companies are most expected to file for liquidation as compared to the public companies, which result to notable loss of jobs at the individual firms (Weber 1). Private equity as a type of organization has its basis in venture capital. The type that is most common is the leveraged buyout (LBO) and this is the one that is under challenge. The

International Tourism Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3500 words

International Tourism - Assignment Example However, Pakistan, even though bestowed with vast areas of unexploited and unexplored, breathtakingly beautiful landmarks, to date has been unable to exploit the travel and tourism industry to its maximum or for that matter, even the minimum level. According to an article available at Eturbonews. "The tourism industry in southern Asia generally showed growth in 2007, except for Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Political instability and a lack of security in these two countries led to a drop in arrivals from abroad: -7% for Pakistan, and -12% for Sri Lanka" The same news states further, "In general, the tourism industry in the subcontinent showed growth of 12%. In 2006."The same article further refers to Pakistan's tourism industry in the following words, " in addition to Sri Lanka, is represented by Pakistan, where tourism demand fell by 7% in 2007". Experts say this is related to the country's serious political instability and frequent terrorist attacks." There are two types of tourists' visiting Pakistan, The foreign Tourists and the domestic tourists. The domestic tourists can further be classified into up-country tourist (moving from the south of the country to the north) and down country tourists (tourists moving from North to South). Since tourism industry is a business mode... Tourist Categories: There are two types of tourists' visiting Pakistan, The foreign Tourists and the domestic tourists. The domestic tourists can further be classified into up-country tourist (moving from the south of the country to the north) and down country tourists (tourists moving from North to South). The major chunk of revenue comes form the foreign tourists who have resources available to splurge in the local markets and outing areas. Factors Impacting Foreign Tourists: Since tourism industry is a business model, the various theories that are used for external analysis apply to the tourism industry. The PESTLE Analysis identifies the external factors that impact the tourism industry of Pakistan. Political, Image of Pakistan: The image of Pakistan post 9/11 has been such that it is known as one of the most terrorist afflicted areas. It is believed that it lacks modern ways to commute and transportation networks fail. The volatile political situation makes if a very difficult choice to travel too especially when travel advisories are being issued against traveling to this country every now and then. Moreover, the frequent bombings and suicide bombings enhance this image further. The recent instances of terrorist kidnappings all paint a very deadly picture. Economic: before 2001, the economy of Pakistan was in doldrums with GDP growth rates as low as 4%. This reflected in a low level of investment in tourism and developments of infrastructure. Due to the lack of development of tourist attractions, Pakistan's tourism industry had stagnated. After 2001, there was a boom with growth reached as high as 7%, however, the wealth did not have a trickle down